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Conversion of Soviet Military Industry
An Interview with Igor Birman
By KEITH ARMES
Igor Birman is a specialist on the Soviet economy and the Soviet military budget. He 
emigrated in 1974 from the Soviet Union, where he worked for some years as an 
economist in the military-industrial complex. He has published a book, Ekonomika 
Nedostach (The Economy of Shortages: New York, Chalidze Publications, 1983), and 
numerous articles on the Soviet economy in the West and the Soviet Union, including 
one in Izvestia as recently as November 29. Birman's estimates of the relative sizes of 
the U.S. and Soviet economies and the Soviet military budget are now accepted by 
many prominent Soviet economists. The interview with the editor of Perspective took 
place in Washington on November 30.
Perspective. Perhaps it's appropriate to ask you first about the potential resources that 
can be freed in the Soviet Union by reducing Soviet arms production and converting 
weapons plants to civilian production. How large do you believe Soviet military 
expenditures to be?
Birman. As you know, a lot depends on definitions. Do you calculate in Soviet current 
prices or in market economy prices? There are many other problems, for instance, 
capital investments in military plants, scientific research, military pensions, and the 
privileges enjoyed by the cadres. In a report I recently submitted to the Pentagon, I 
calculated that Soviet annual military expenditures, narrowly defined, in current prices, 
amount to R130-150 billion. However, if we also consider that prices of raw materials 
are artificially low, that the prices of military goods do not include profits (as they do in 
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the West), and that Soviet enterprises in the military-industrial complex work under 
especially favorable, "conservatory," conditions, in my view Soviet military expenditures 
are at least R200 billion.(1) That represents about 25 percent of Soviet GNP.
Perspective. A Soviet economist recently stated that 60 percent of all machinery 
produced by the machine-building industry went to arms plants. Would you agree?
Birman. Because of the completely artificial Soviet prices, nobody knows. But it would 
certainly be fair to say that it is the majority, 55-75 percent of all production. The Soviet 
government is still not giving full information on military expenditures to the Soviet 
people. The Soviet Ministry of Defense did not give complete figures to the Presidential 
Commission that developed the "500-Day Plan" for economic reform. As recently as the 
end of September, even the Presidential Council was given absurd figures on arms 
production.
Perspective. By the end of the conversion program, the Soviet government plans to 
reduce arms production to 80 percent of the 1988 level. It is also claimed that from 1988 
to 1995 the percentage of production capacity of military industry devoted to civilian 
goods will rise from 40 percent to 60 percent. Do you find these assertions realistic?
Birman. I am rather skeptical about these figures. Soviet sources never explain how 
these percentages are calculated—in physical units or artificial, wrong prices. By 1995, 
some weapons may indeed be produced on a reduced scale. However, they are going 
ahead with the production of new weapons—for example, they recently tested a new 
type of nuclear weapon in Novaya Zemlya—and there may be an increase in the 
production of more modern, more powerful weaponry. Though I would accept that quite 
possibly there may be some reduction in overall weapons production, I am skeptical 
about any large-scale reduction. In any case, an increase from 40 to 60 percent in 
capacity devoted to civilian goods is not very dramatic. I'm not impressed at all by these 
numbers.
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Perspective. There is also the problem of the huge investments required for 
conversion. The Soviet government cites a total cost of R40 billion—R9 billion for re-
equipping production lines and R31 billion for creating new production capacity for 
consumer goods.
Conversion seems to mean not the turnover of part of the military industry to civilian 
production, but setting up new civilian production facilities within the arms industry while 
maintaining military production capacity virtually intact.
Birman. It is normal in the West to talk in money terms, but the Soviet economy is in 
such disarray that the ruble is worthless. It is a question of resources—raw materials, 
qualified labor, energy, parts, etc. Moreover, the necessary equipment for conversion is 
not available in the Soviet Union. New industries for the production of consumer goods 
have to be created, and this is impossible as long as armaments production continues 
and the present economic system still exists.
Perspective. I read in the Soviet press about resistance to conversion on the part of 
leading officials in the military-industrial complex. This year, large numbers of contracts 
for the production of consumer goods have not been fulfilled, and so far a substantial 
percentage of contracts under negotiation for the next year has not been concluded. 
What do you consider to be the causes of this resistance to the process?
Birman. The reluctance is due to many causes. A lot of the people in responsible 
positions in the military-industrial complex are not young. At the end of their careers, 
they don't want to go through a period of transition and don't care to change their habits. 
Another factor is that they are not convinced that a market economy is right for their 
industries. Also they believe that the military-industrial complex is the best sector of the 
country's economy. Why should they destroy it?
Perspective. It is an ironic fact that the conversion program is being run by the Council 
of Ministers' Military-Industrial Commission and by Gosplan department—the very 
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people who have an interest in the maintenance of the military industries. I.G. Belousov, 
the chairman of the commission, himself comes from the military-industrial complex. 
Many people see this as a major problem.
Birman. Yes, but it is more complex than that. The people in charge of the military-
industrial complex may be the most capable and best educated cadres in the Soviet 
Union. You know there is the story about Fadeyev [long-time chairman of the Soviet 
Writers' Union] complaining to Stalin about the quality of the writers in the union. Stalin 
told Fadeyev, "Sorry, I don't have better writers for you." Similarly, Gorbachev doesn't' 
have any better managers. They certainly exist, but Gorbachev doesn't know how to 
select people.
Perspective. One of the goals of the conversion is the production of consumer goods 
for the export in order to earn hard currency. A problem where is the mania for secrecy 
and the very great extent to which industrial information is classified. According to the 
Soviet press, it's sometimes easier for a Soviet enterprise to cooperate with a Western 
company in a joint venture, than to work jointly with another Soviet enterprise in view of 
the information barriers.
Birman. Yes, that is true, but the problem is much bigger than that. I do not believe 
within the next few years even the best Soviet military enterprises will be capable of 
producing high-quality consumer goods marketable in the West. The best hop is to 
export military equipment to people like Saddam Hussein. Secondly, they can produce 
consumer goods for the domestic market, or possibly for East European countries too 
poor to afford to buy from the West.
Perspective. So that the best prospect is to export low-tech products?
Birman. Yes, but even then it will take years before industry is capable of producing 
high-quality goods. How do you expect Soviet industry with poor infrastructure, poor 
cadres, and no experience of producing quality goods to produce marketable exports? 
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You can't expect such a miracle. I were a Western capitalist I would not be afraid of 
Soviet competition on the consumer goods market maybe for decades.
Perspective. Given the lamentable state of Soviet industry, what policies should the 
Soviet government pursue in your view?
Birman. The military industry of the Soviet Union must be liquidated, period. Otherwise 
there will be a catastrophe. The Soviet Union will end up in the same state as Abyssinia. 
As you well know, I have predicting this for a long time. Privatization of the economy 
and capitalism is the only possible solution. Liberation from state control and 
privatization should begin with the military industry since it has the best cadres and 
technology. Carthago delenda est.
Perspective. Will any Soviet central government be prepared to stop armaments 
production completely?
Birman. We are observing the final months of a central Soviet government. I strongly 
believe that within a year there will no longer be a central government that will be able 
to make decisions on matters like conversion. The 15 republics will be forced to 
establish capitalism and private enterprise.
Perspective. What do you see as the prospects for the Russian economy in the coming 
years?
Birman. My best prediction is that an economic decline will continue for years, 
depending on the political situation, before there is a stabilization of the situation. Then 
in 7-10 years, possibly a slow improvement may begin. You must understand a very 
simple thing—for the 73 years of crimes, mistakes, and idiocies a high price will have to 
be paid.
5
Perspective. What is your view on the advisability of Western aid in the present 
situation?
Birman. I am very much troubled by the willingness of the West to provide aid unless 
and until the system is transformed and the assistance can bring about improvement. To 
enable the system to survive a bit longer is an idiocy.
Notes: 
1. The current official exchange rate is $1=R2 while the tourist rate stands at $1=R6. 
However, it is Dr. Birman's emphatic opinion that such dollar comparisons are 
meaningless.
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